Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Wilson,G/Schpall,S, Lucretius and Thomas Mautner

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner]
A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius]
The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius]
The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius]
'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius]
The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius]
If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius]
In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Atoms move themselves [Lucretius]
If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spirit is mortal [Lucretius]
For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius]
An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius]
If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius]